"Consequentialism" refers to a class of normative moral theories which maintain that an action is morally right if the consequences of that action are more favorable than unfavorable.

Thus, correct moral conduct is determined solely by a cost-benefit analysis of an action's consequences. Consequentialism requires that we first tally both the good and bad consequences of an action; we then determine whether the total good consequences outweigh the total bad consequences. If the good consequences are greater, then the action is morally proper. If the bad consequences are greater, then the action is morally improper.

Most versions of consequentialism are more precisely formulated than the general principle above. In particular, contending consequentialist theories specify which consequences for affected groups of people are relevant. Subdivisions of consequentialism emerge:

* Ethical Egoism: an action is morally right if the consequences of that action are more favorable than unfavorable only to the agent performing the action.

Proponents of ethical egoism appeal a psychological principle of motivation called psychological egoism. Psychological egoism states that all human actions, with no exception, are ultimately motivated by selfish interests. This, they argue, is an unalterable fact of human nature. Egoists argue further that moral obligation must operate within the confines of our human makeup (we clearly cannot be expected to perform actions beyond our abilities). The conclusion they draw, then, is that ethical egoism is the only possible criterion for ethical judgment since it alone recognizes our completely selfish motivations.

Unfortunately, all of these appeals to instinctive motives fail, for there is no way to empirically establish whether human nature is instinctively selfish, benevolent, or some mixture of the two. All consequentialist theories can be evaluated from the standpoint of our common moral intuitions.

Problems are immediately revealed with ethical egoism. According to ethical egoism, acts of lying, stealing, and even killing would be morally permissible so long as (1) the agent benefited, and (2) he was not caught.

But, it is clearly contrary to our common notions of morality to call such acts "moral." Finally, all versions of consequentialism leave open the possibility that a heinous action, such as torture or slavery, could be morally permissible if its benefits outweighed its disbenefits. However, our common moral intuitions tell us that such actions are unjust regardless of the beneficial consequences produced. Consequentialism, then, appears to be flawed at its very root since justice can be dispensed with if it produces the appropriate benefits.